Publications

Elite Cues and Non-compliance

Dickson, Zachary P. and Sara B HoboltAmerican Political Science Review (2024) Article | PDF | Supplemental Materials | Replication
Media: APSA | PsyPost

The Effects of COVID-19 Infection on Opposition to COVID-19 Policies: Evidence from the U.S. Congress

Dickson, Zachary P. and T. Murat Yildirim Political Communication (2024) Article | PDF | Replication
Media: PsyPost

The Gender Gap in Elite-Voter Responsiveness Online

Dickson, Zachary P. Perspectives on Politics (2024) Article | PDF | Replication

Going against the Grain: Climate Change as a Wedge Issue for the Radical Right

Dickson, Zachary P. and Sara B Hobolt Comparative Political Studies (2024) Article | PDF | Replication

The Youth Gender Gap in Support for the Far Right

Đorđe Milosav, Dickson, Zachary P., Sara B Hobolt, Heike Klüver, and Toni Rodon Journal of European Public Policy (2025) Article | Supplemental Materials

Working Papers

Accommodating the Radical Right: The Electoral Costs for Social Democratic Parties

Stuart J. Turnbull-Dugarte, Jack Bailey, Daniel Devine, Dickson, Zachary P., Sara B Hobolt, Will Jennings, Robert Johns and Katharina Lawall
Working draft
Media: The New Statesman

Abstract

_{Social democratic parties across Europe have increasingly adopted restrictive immigration rhetoric in response to radical right challengers’ electoral successes. The consequences of accommodation remain contested. This paper leverages a pre-registered quasi-experimental design exploiting within-individual variation from as-good-as-random exposure to UK Labour leader Keir Starmer’s “Island of Strangers” speech – a major rhetorical turn toward anti-immigration positions. We find that exposure significantly altered perceptions of Labour, making it appear more anti-immigration and right-leaning. Crucially, these shifts carried electoral costs: support for Labour declined within individuals following the speech. While we detect no corresponding gains for the radical right Reform UK party, there is also no evidence that Labour’s adoption of nativist rhetoric diminished Reform’s appeal. Our findings highlight the risks of strategic convergence, showing that accommodation of exclusionary rhetoric by social democratic parties is electorally costly for them rather than for their radical right competitors.}

Public Service Delivery and Support for the Populist Right

Dickson, Zachary P., Sara B Hobolt, Catherine E de Vries and Simone Cremaschi
Working draft
Media: The Guardian | Social Europe | The Economist
Slides: EPSA 2024

Abstract

_{The rise of the populist right is extensively studied, yet relatively little attention has been paid to how the delivery of core public services may drive voter support for such parties. Given that public services are often the primary means through which citizens interact with the state, declining public service performance has the potential to create grievances that reduce trust in established political parties while increasing the appeal of anti-establishment populist parties. We examine this empirically in the British context, focusing on one the core aspects of public service provision in the UK – the publicly-funded National Health Service (NHS). We argue that reduced public health service performance has caused an increase support for populist right parties. Combining government administrative panel data on the closure of local health care facilities – General Practitioner (GP) practices – with fine-grained geo-spatial panel data on public preferences and voting intention from multiple sources, we apply a staggered difference-in-differences design to show support for our argument. Our findings illustrate the corrosive effects of declining public service performance, revealing decreased public satisfaction with public health care, decreased patient experiences in areas affected by GP practice closures, and increased support and feelings of closeness to populist right parties. Heterogeneous treatment effects show that immigration and increased registrations of migrants at local GP practices exacerbate the link between declining public service delivery and propensity to vote for the populist right. Our findings contribute to the literature on the rise of the populist right, demonstrating the role of public service delivery in driving support for populist parties, especially in local areas undergoing rapid demographic change.}

Inequality and Support for Right-wing Populism in Britain

Dickson, Zachary P. and Sara B Hobolt Working draft

Abstract

_{The rise of right-wing populism is a defining feature of contemporary politics. The literature explaining this phenomenon points to either economic grievances or a backlash against cultural change. Crucial to both explanations, we argue, are feelings of relative status loss and perceived inequality that fuel resentment and lead to support for politicians who promise to protect the interests of aggrieved populations. We test this argument in the United Kingdom by examining the effects of localized wealth inequality—proxied by housing values—on support for the populist right. We assemble a novel dataset that includes the universe of house price transactions from 1995-2022, and use machine learning methods to estimate the dynamic value of the majority of residential property in the nation. After constructing small-area spatio-temporal estimates of house price inequality, we leverage multiple empirical strategies to estimate the effects of inequality on local support for the populist right using a newly assembled panel of UK local election results. Across several analyses, our results demonstrate that inequality increases support for the populist right, and that the relationship is conditioned by perceived status loss. These findings have important implications for our understanding of wealth inequality and support for right-wing populism.}

Benchmarking Support for Climate Action

Dickson, Zachary P., Sara B Hobolt, Toni Rodon, Heike Kluver, and Theresa Kuhn Pre-analysis plan

Abstract

_{Climate change is one of the greatest collective action problems we face as a society. Yet, the costs associated with reducing carbon emissions to address the changing climate continues to constrain the degree to which governments and voters make necessary changes. In this project, we study the conditions that induce voters to accept higher costs for collective climate action. Specifically, we are interested in how benchmarking the relative vulnerability to climate change and the relative costs associated with climate change policies vis-à-vis other nations influence support for costly collective climate action in international organizations. Using a visual survey experiment fielded across all 27 European Union nations following the 2024 European Parliament elections, we examine the degree to which relatively vulnerability to the negative impacts of climate change and relative contribution to related costs shape voters’ support for costly climate change policies.}

Energy Prices and Backlash to Climate Policies

Dickson, Zachary P. Working draft

Abstract

_{Who bears the costs of decarbonization—and who is blamed for such costs—has become a central cleavage in contemporary party competition. Building on research on ``green backlash’’ and the populist radical right (PRR), this article argues that sharp and uneven household energy price shocks create fertile ground for PRR entrepreneurs to frame Net Zero as unfairly costly. I examine the United Kingdom’s 2021–2023 energy surge and show two linked patterns. First, using a new text measure applied to PRR communications in official press releases and in YouTube videos, I document explicit blame attribution of higher energy bills to Net Zero policies. Second, leveraging pre-treatment geographic vulnerability, measured by over 27 million household Energy Performance Certificates, I adopt difference-in-differences and triple-differences designs to find that individuals in less energy efficient areas become more likely to support PRR parties after 2021. Further evidence using the British Election Study panel suggests that voters indeed blamed environmental policy instead of the economy more broadly, implying that political support for Net Zero hinges on cushioning the most vulnerable households.}

From Exit to Reform Euroscepticism: The Evolution of Radical Right Opposition to the EU

Sara B Hobolt, Catherine E de Vries, Dickson, Zachary P. and Dirck De Kleer

Abstract

_{Euroscepticism has formed a core part of the platform of radical right parties for decades. Yet, we argue that the radical right has shifted its focus from leaving the EU (exit Euroscepticism) to repatriating powers to the nation (reform Euroscepticism) in recent years. In response to both shifting public opinion following Brexit and office-seeking ambitions, radical right parties have largely abandoned their policy of exiting the EU, focusing instead on sovereignty and stronger borders within the EU. Using a novel embedding regression approach to analyse party press releases as well as a qualitative case study, we demonstrate that the EU rhetoric of mainstream and populist right parties has converged in the last decade. Analysing survey data, we similarly find a convergence in EU attitudes among mainstream and radical rightwing supporters. Our findings thus suggest that the nature of Euroscepticism is dynamic, yet the challenge to the European project remains.}

A coordinated solution for a coordinated problem? A Civic Education experiment on climate change and attitudes towards the European Union

Irene Rodriguez, Toni Rodon and Dickson, Zachary P.

Abstract

_{Climate change is a worldwide problem that requires both individual and coordinated solutions. The EU, as a supra-national institution, plays a crucial role in tackling the causes and consequences of the climate crisis. In this article, we ask whether people primed to think about the need for coordination become more likely to favour the EU and a coordinated solution to climate change. Collaborating with the “More in 24” campaign, which aims to educate young voters about the EU in an accessible, fun, and engaging way, as well as raising awareness to increase youth turnout, we conduct a randomised field experiment to causally identify the effects of political education (civic education) on high-school students’ attitudes about coordination in response to climate change. We find that the civic education lessons increased students’ perceived knowledge about the EU and helped them reflect on climate change differently, but yet the campaign was not enough to increase students’ opinion that the EU should have a greater role in fighting climate change. Our findings suggest that, while these programs may have other educational benefits besides what is studied here, if the goal is to change some fundamental, likely ingrained social and political attitudes, these programs probably need to devote more resources and time if they want to achieve their goal}